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IS REGIONALISM BETTER FOR ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION?
NATIONS, REGIONS, AND RISK SHARING
Ignacio Ortu~no Ortin and Jaume Sempere
WP-AD 2000-16
A B S T R A C T
Our analysis yields some conclusions about the political role of regions
in the formation of supranational economic areas, which turns out to be
quite di®erent from the role of nations. The claim that regions have more
incentives than nations to attain a ¯scal agreement implying full economic
integration is likely to be correct when nations are economic stable arrange-
ments, i.e. when the rich region of a nation is not \exploited" by the poor
region. When, on the other hand, it is not on the interest of a rich region to
be part of a nation, attempts to achieve full economic integration among a
group of nations is more likely to be successful if nations, instead of regions,
are the decision makers.
Keywords: Federalism; Fiscal coinsurance; Migration.
JEL classi¯cation: H11, H77, H87.
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1 Introduction
In Europe increased integration among nations is coexisting with increasing
autonomy of regions within nations. That more integration can induce more
autonomy is a phenomenon that has been studied in the literature (see, for
instance, Alesina and Spaolare, 1997). A theoretical question that has not
been studied is whether increasing autonomy of the regions can reinforce
or not the integration process. In other words, whether giving the regions
enough ¯scal autonomy would result in a ¯scal agreement implying di®erent
levels of integration than those resulting in economies where only nations
decide.
In this paper we focus on how the incentives of regions di®er from those of
nations when chosing a type of common ¯scal arrangement. We will consider
a very simple but, we hope, relevant and clarifying environment with only two
nations. Each nation will consist of two regions. A unitary ¯scal arrangement
would bring full insurance against local shocks for all the nations (and for
the regions forming the nations) 1. Under a federal system, however, risk-
sharing is achieved by means of migration from poor regions to richer regions.
Since migration is costly a federal system provides only partial insurance
against local risks. One might think that independent regions, being smaller
economic areas than nations, are exposed to higher risks and as a consequence
have stronger incentives, as compared to nations, to form a union. A nation,
on the other hand, might prefer the partial insurance mechanism provided by
the ¯scal system since it faces a lower risk and the full insurance associated
with a unitary state might be \too expensive."
We will show, however, that the previous intuition might be quite mis-
leading. Suppose that one of the two nations is richer than the other in
expected terms and, in the same way, within each nation one region is richer
than the other. Thus, suppose that di®erent nations, and di®erent regions,
each face di®erent idiosyncratic risks. It is true that the regions, as indepen-
dent economic areas, might face higher risks than they would if they were
part of a nation. But now the income dispersion among the four regions is
also higher than the income dispersion among the two nations. In this case,
the richest region might ¯nd a partial insurance arrangement more pro¯table
1We abstract from the political risk discussed, for instance, in Alesina and Perotti
(1995)
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than a unitary state and at the same time, were nations the players, both
nations prefer the full insurance associated with the unitary agreement to a
partial insurance system.
The relevance of our analysis rests on the assumption that nations (or re-
gions) cannot obtain full insurance against idiosyncratic shocks in the mar-
ket. Thus, in our approach the union and the federation can be seen as
institutions that o®er risk-sharing that is not provided by the market. Obst-
feld (1994), Shiller and Athanasoulis (1995), Athanasoulis and van Wincoop
(1998), and van Wincoop (1999) provide empirical estimations of potential
welfare gains from international and interregional risk-sharing above those
not provided by the market. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) and Asdrubali,
Sorensen, and Yosha (1996) also provide empirical estimations of the channels
for interregional risk sharing and of the regional risk that remains uninsured
within the United States. Sorensen and Yosha (1998) estimate than a lot less
risk sharing is achieved within countries in the European Union than within
the United States. Forni and Reichlin (1999) provide some measures of the
potential insurable risk for the European countries.
One remaining question to assess the merit of the analysis provided in
this paper is whether migration is, in reality, an important way to share risks
among nations or regions. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1992) provide
evidence of the relationship between migration °ows to US states and per
capita income. Blanchard and Katz (1992) also show that migration is an
important insurance device against regional busines cycle shocks. Eichen-
green (1993) ¯nds a strong relationship between migration and the lagged
growth-rate of wages in the US.
Closely related to this paper is the approach taken by Bucovetsky (1998),
who compares the incentives for two regions to choose a federal state agree-
ment versus a unitary state. In this paper, regions su®er stochastic idiosyn-
cratic shocks and so the motive for the agreement is to provide insurance.
The important parameters to take into acount are related to risk aversion,
di®erences in expected income, and migration costs.
Alesina and Perotti (1995) also analize the risk-sharing motive for achiev-
ing a ¯scal agreement. They discuss the trade o® between more economic
risk sharing and more political risk. Persson and Tabellini (1996a and 1996b)
analyze the perverse incentives that the insurance contract{¯scal agreement
create for the local governments.
Other discussions about federal versus unitary agreements are provided
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by Quian and Roland (1999) where the gains from decentralization are given
in terms of competition between local governments and decreased ability
to bail out ine±cient ¯rms. Alesina and Spaolare (1997), and Alesina and
Warcziarg (1998, 1999) discuss the optimal size and number of nations. The
degree of openness of the economies, increasing returns in the provision of
public goods, and the diseconomies of taking decisions for larger communities
determine the optimal size of nations. Bolton and Roland (1997) study how
the redistribution policies are a®ected by the incentives to secede. Fidrmuc
(1998) explores how the nature of the stochastic shocks a®ect the incentives
to secede.
Obviously, closely related to our paper, as we also study migration as a
form of insurance, are Wildasin (1995 and 2000). However there the issue is
more how more risk sharing provided by the possibility of migration changes
the distribution of risk among the members of a region and the implied e®ects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 presents the di®erent type of agreements to be considered. Section 4 shows
some results that will be useful for the proof of the main proposition. Section
5 discusses our main result. Section 6 concludes the paper with some ¯nal
remarks. Finally an Appendix presents the proofs of our results.
2 The Model
Our model shares its basics features with the model developed in Bucovetsky
(1998) with the di®erence that we will consider two possible levels of decision.
The national level is modeled exactly as in Bucovetsky's, but in this paper
each nation consists of two regions which face idiosyncratic regional shocks.
We will consider two nations, A and B. A consists of two regions A1 and
A2, and B consists of regions B1 and B2 (sometimes we write Rj to denote
the region j of nation R , j 2 f1; 2g; R 2 fA;Bg). We normalize population
so that the number of people in each region is 1/2. So each nation's total
population is 1.
There is uncertainty about the national production level (which will be
also given in per capita terms, given our normalization). It can be either ½, if
the good state of nature happens in that nation, or 1 if the bad state occurs,
where ½ > 1. We assume that national production levels are negatively
correlated, i.e. if one nation gets the good state of nature then the other
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nation obtains the bad state of nature. We make this assumption in order to
concentrate our analysis on the possible risk sharing advantages of forming
a union2. The good state of nature occurs in nation A with probability ¼
(so the good state of nature occurs in B with probability 1¡¼). We assume
that ¼ > 1=2 so country A is richer than country B in expected terms.
We also assume that regional idiosyncratic shocks can happen. These
shocks are such that they add the amount °=2 to the production level in
a lucky region and reduce the production level by °=2 in an unlucky one.
We assume that within either country there is a perfect negative correlation
between the regional shocks so that when region R1 gets a positive (negative)
shock region R2 gets a negative (positive) shock. This implies that a lucky
region in a lucky nation (from now on, in the state HH) will have the total
production
YHH =
½+ °
2
A unlucky region in a lucky nation (state HL) would have
YHL =
½¡ °
2
A lucky region in an unlucky nation (state LH) would have
YLH =
1 + °
2
And, ¯nally, an unlucky region in an unlucky nation (state LL) would have
YLL =
1¡ °
2
Region R1; R 2 fA;Bg, is lucky with probability p (so region R2, R 2
fA;Bg, is lucky with probability 1¡ p). We assume that p ¸ 1=2 so A1 and
B1 are the rich regions (in expected terms) in nations A and B, respectively.
We will interpret A1 and B1 as the North in each nation and A2 and B2 as
the South. Note that the probability p is the same in both nations. These
2Obviously a more realistic assumption would be that shocks can go in any direction.
However if we do not consider negatively correlated shocks there would be no point of
talking about risk sharing. A more general assumption which gives the same results would
be that on top of the more general shocks there are important shocks that are negatively
correlated.
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regional production levels are consistent with the national ones de¯ned pre-
viously. For simplicity we will assume:
(A.1) ½¡ ° = 1 + °.
So that the unlucky region in the lucky nation will have the same income
(and per capita income) as the lucky region in the unlucky nation. Our
results will not depend crucially on (A1), as long as the di®erence between
½ ¡ ° and 1 + ° is not large3. This assumption implies a particular form of
the regional shocks. By solving the equation in (A.1) we have that
° = (½¡ 1)=2 (1)
Our assumption (A1) allows for an alternative interpretation of the model:
one region, the lucky one, gets a positive shock of °
2
and the unlucky region
gets the negative shock °
2
. The other two regions do not su®er shocks and
each of them obtains the average per capita income 1+°
2
:
When we talk of the economy where nations are the agents it is assumed
that nations are unitary states so that their governments make the transfers
needed to equalize income within regions in the same nation. Thus in the
economy with nations the regional shocks will not be relevant.
We assume that all agents of a given nation or region are identical to each
other. In this case, the preferences of a nation R; and the preferences of a
region Rj , coincide with the individual preferences of their members.
(A.2) All regions and nations share the same von Neuman Morgenstern
3Obviously the empirical relevance of the assumption will depend on how the North
and South are aggregated within each nation. For instance, (see graph 5.3 in Esteban,
1994), in 1989, (taking 100 as the average per capita income in the European Union), 40%
of the population in Spain lived in regions having a per capita income between 110 and
80. This would be the North of Spain. 55% of the population of France live in regions
that had per capita income above 100. This could be the North of France in our model.
The South of France would be the 45% living in regions that have a per capita between
100 and 80 (thus providing a high degree of overlap with the North of Spain). The South
of Spain would be the 60% living in regions having a per capita income lower than 80.
Similar considerations could be used to construct the North and South of the respective
Northern and Southern countries. The outliers are Greece and Portugal where all regions
have per capita incomes lower than the poorest region in several Nothern countries. This
would not be very important for any of our results as (A.1) could be relaxed as far as
lemma 1 remains true for a relevant set of the parameters.
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concave utility function U with per capita income as the argument. This
utility function presents constant relative risk aversion. Thus we can write
U(x) = x
1¡¯
1¡¯ ; ¯ > 0, where x is per capita income
4.
The total resources in a region are distributed equally among all the
residents so that the per capita income is the same for all of them. Thus,
an agent that migrates from a poor region to a richer region would obtain a
higher income. There is, however, a positive migration cost.
(A.3) There is a constant individual cost c ¸ 0 of migrating from one region
to another. This cost is the same whether the migration takes place within a
country or from a region in a country to a region in a di®erent country.
This is clearly a strong assumption but our results are robust to small
changes allowing for lower migration cost within a country than across countries5.
In fact we could allow for large di®erences in the migration costs as long as
the income dispersion between regions is large enough. Nevertheless, in or-
der to keep things simple, we will assume throughout the paper the three
previous axioms.
Following Bucovetsky (1998) we de¯ne a Federal ¯scal agreement as one
in which there is free migration among the nations or regions involved, but
no transfers to equalize per capita income among the di®erent regions. A
Unitary ¯scal agreement (we also call it a Union) is the one in which a
central authority uses transfers to equalize per capita income in the di®erent
locations and, consequently, there is no migration. Reality is, no doubt,
more complicated than what we assume here. The main feature we want to
capture, however, is that under a federal arrangement there are less regional
transfers and, as a consequence, more migration than under a unitary
arrangement.
We will consider two types of environments depending on whether the
decision makers are the regions or the nations. The four types of agreements
we analyze are : (i) a union of nations A and B (UN); (ii) a federation of
nations A and B (FN); (iii) a federation of regions A1; A2; B1 and B2 (FR);
4This assumption is also made in Bucovetsky.
5If the cost of migrating to other region within a nation is very small then there is no
point in comparing the economy with regions with the economy with nations. Trivially,
free migration with very low migration cost between regions in a nation will make each of
the regions in each nation share (almost) the same income and therefore they will behave
as nations.
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and (iv) a union of regions A1; A2; B1 and B2 (UR). In cases i) and ii) the
decision makers are the nations meanwhile in cases iii) and iv) the decision
makers are the regions. We also consider the case in which the two nations
are separated (S).
3 Description of Agreements
3.1 Separated nations
When the two nations are separated, we assume that there are neither inter-
national migration °ows nor transfers from one nation to the other nation.
The expected utility nation A would obtain in this case is
ESA = ¼U(½) + (1¡ ¼)U(1)
and the expected utility of nation B is
ESB = (1¡ ¼)U(½) + ¼U(1)
These are the minimum utility levels that nations should obtain in order for
them to be willing to participate in any other possible arrangement.
3.2 Global Union
Given our assumptions, in a unitary state (consisting of the union of nations
A and B or of the union of regions A1; A2; B1 and B2) the level of transfers
is such that each region would end up with the same per capita income,
(½ + 1)=2; with certainty. Therefore the expected utility for each region, or
nation, would be
UU = U
µ
½+ 1
2
¶
Thus, under the global union there is complete sharing of resources and all
agents obtain the same income.
3.3 Federation of Nations
The analysis in this section follows directly from Bucovetsky's analysis of a
federation between two nations. The players are nation A and nation B.
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Since a nation is the union of two regions, the per capita income within a
nation is the same for all agents, regardless of their residency. Thus, all
agents in a independent nation in the good state of nature (state H) would
obtain the income level ½, while in the bad state of nature (state L), they
would obtain the income level 1. The two nations might decide to form a
federation. We assume that they must decide before knowing which nation
gets the good state of nature. The preferences of a nation coincide with the
expected utility of a representative agent and, since all agents end up with the
same income, there is no aggregation problem: a nation seeks to maximize
expected utility where the von Neuman Morgerstern utility function, U , is
the one given in our Axiom 2.
If a federation of nation A and nation B is formed, then agents will be
able to migrate within the federation. Some agents from the nation in the
bad state of nature will migrate to the other nation, where the residents,
regardless where they came from, will equally share the total income ½ . The
equilibrium migration condition (equation (4) in Bucovetsky) is
½
1 + nn
¡ c = 1
1¡ nn (2)
where nn is the net °ow of migrants from the unlucky to the lucky nation.
This condition means that per capita income in the lucky nation net of
migration costs should equal that of the unlucky nation. This should hold
for the marginal migrant. We will denote by Cj per capita income, after
migration takes place, for residents in a nation in the j state of nature,
j 2 fH;Lg. This means that the above condition could be written as
CH ¡ c = CL (20)
Expected utility under the federation of nations for the rich nation A is
EUFNA = ¼U(CH) + (1¡ ¼)U(CL) (3)
and for B, the poor nation, expected utility is
EUFNB = (1¡ ¼)U(CH) + ¼U(CL) (4)
Note that existence of a positive migration cost prevents income levels from
equalizing across nations. Original residents of a nation in state of nature H
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end up with an income level greater than the one obtained by agents from
the other nation. And, clearly, all agents from the nation with the state of
nature L obtain the same net income, i.e. the ones that migrate to the rich
nation obtain the same (net) income as the ones that do not migrate. In the
extreme case of no migration costs, c = 0, the income of all agents would be
equalized and a federation would coincide with a union of nations.
3.4 Federation of Regions
Now we suppose that the decision makers, or players, are the regions. The
agreement to be analyzed here is the federation of the all four regions (FR).
We don't consider the possibility of a partial federation of two or three re-
gions. It is also important to notice that our analysis of a federation of
regions is not equivalent to the analysis of a federation of four \smaller" na-
tions, because the two regions of a nation share a \national shock" in their
resources.
Under a federation, agents are free to migrate from one region to another.
There are no transfers so that the vector of total income levels obtained,
after the realization of the national and regional shocks, by the regions is
fYHH ; YHL; YLH ; YLLg. In this case the migration equilibrium is more di±cult
to characterize. The di±culties come from the fact that migration could take
place among any combination of regions.
The next lemma, however, shows that under our assumptions, for all
positive migration costs, migration occurs only from the unlucky region in
the unlucky nation to the lucky region in the lucky nation. In this case the
condition for migration equilibrium is
YHH
1=2 + nr
¡ c = YLL
1=2¡ nr (5)
where nr is the net °ow of migrants from the unlucky region in the unlucky
nation to the lucky region in the lucky nation. Denoting by Cij per capita
consumption in the region with state of nature ij, we could rewrite the above
expression as CHH ¡ c = CLL.
Lemma 1:Let (A.1),(A.2), and (A.3) hold. In the federation of regions the
only equilibrium migration °ows occur from the region in state (LL) to the
region in state (HH).
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Note that Axiom 1 implies that CHL = CLH : Then the expected utility
under the federation of regions for the rich region in the rich nation, i.e.
region A1; is
EUFRA1 = ¼pU(CHH) + [(1¡ ¼)p+ ¼(1¡ p)]U(CHL) + (1¡ ¼)(1¡ p)U(CLL)
The expected utility for region A2 is
EUFRA2 = ¼(1¡ p)U(CHH) + [¼p+ (1¡ ¼)(1¡ p)]U(CHL) + (1¡ ¼)pU(CLL)
The expected utility for region B1 is
EUFRB1 = (1¡ ¼)pU(CHH) + [(1¡ ¼)(1¡ p) + ¼p]U(CHL) + ¼(1¡ p)U(CLL)
And the expected utility for region B2 is
EUFRB2 = (1¡ ¼)(1¡ p)U(CHH) + [(1¡ ¼)p+ ¼(1¡ p)]U(CHL) + ¼pU(CLL)
One can show that under a federation of regions the expected utility for A1
is higher than the expected utility for any other region. More precisely
EUFRA1 ¸ EUFRz ; z 2 fA2; B1; B2g (6)
This is an important inequality which will be used when comparing the fed-
eration and the union of regions and it is easily obtained by an standard
application of ¯rst order stochastic dominance.
4 The National versus the Regional Economy
In this section we start comparing the economy with regions with the econ-
omy with nations. The ¯rst of our results implies that the lucky region in
the lucky nation receives more immigration in the federation of regions (FR)
than in the federation of nations (FN). The intuition behind this result is
that the dispersion of per capita incomes is larger in the regional economy
and that this yields more migration. Recall from condition (5) that nr is the
equilibrium migration °ow from the region in state LL to the region in state
HH under the arrangement (FR). In the (FN) case, nn, the migration °ow
from the nation in the bad state of nature to the nation on the good state
12
of nature, is given by (2). Since a nation always equalizes the income across
its regions it is natural to assume that the immigration °ow nn is equally
shared by the two regions conforming the nation6. Thus, under the scenario
(FN) each region of the lucky nation receives the migration °ow nn
2
. Let cm
be the lowest value of the migration cost such that none wants to migrate
under the (FN) arrangement. We want to consider cases in which migration
°ows are positive, so we will assume migration costs lower than cm: We have
Lemma 2: Let (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) hold. Let c < cm. Then nr >
nn
2
.
The result of the previous lemma implies that per capita income for the
region in state HH , after the migration °ows have taken place, is smaller in
the federation of regions than in the federation of nations. That is:
Lemma 3: Let (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) hold. Let c < cm. Then, i) CHH <
CH ; ii) CLL < CL.
Our third result regarding the economy with regions is that the expected
utility of the richest region, A1, in (FR) is increasing with the di®erence
between its expected income and the expected income of region A2. That is,
it is increasing in p.
Lemma 4: Let (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) hold. Let 0 · c < cm. Then EUFRA1
is strictly increasing in p.
This is very important for our main results as it implies that increasing
regional income dispersion increases the expected utility of the richest region
in a federation of regions. However, the expected utility of that region in
a federation of nations remains constant upon changes in regional income
dispersion.
Bucovetsky (1998) shows that, for a degree of relative risk aversion ¯ >
2; 7 the expected utility of a nation under a federation (FN) is a quasi-concave
function of the migration cost c. The fourth result states that the expected
utility of a region under (FR) is also quasi-concave on c, for c ¸ 0. Thus we
6This assumption is introduced to simplify the analysis and the main results of the
paper don't depend on it.
7Following Shiller and Athanasoulis (1995), ¯ = 3 represents a \consensus by many
who work in this topic". This is also the average of the estimates reported in Friend and
Blume (1975). Therefore assuming ¯ > 2 is not an unrealistic assumption.
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have:
Lemma 5: Let (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) hold. Let 0 · c < cm and ¯ > 2:
Then EUFRA1 is a quasi-concave function of c.
Given that by Lemma 1 there will be no migration in the intermediate
regions, the problem is formally similar to the one in Bucovetsky. The proof
of this lemma is just a translation to our problem of the proof of Lemma 1
of Bucovestky.
5 When Will Regions Prefer More Integra-
tion than Nations?
We want to analyze under which conditions regions would choose to form a
union whereas nations would choose to form a federation. The poor nation,
B, always prefers a union of nations (UN) to a federation of nations (FN).
This is due to the fact that under (UN) each nation gets the per capita income
1+½
2
for sure whereas in the (FN) regime B faces a lottery with expected value
lower than 1+½
2
: Nation A, however, might or might not prefer the union to
the federal regime depending on the value of the di®erent parameters of our
economy. It might even be the case that A prefers separation to both (FN)
and (FR). To rule out this possibility, i.e. to guarantee what Bucovetsky
calls Individual Rationality of the Union, we impose the following condition
(A.4) ½¯¡1 ¸ ¼
1¡¼ .
It is easy to show that the above inequality implies EUUNA ¸ EUSA 8. In this
case, both nations prefer the Union to Separation.
If nation A prefers (UN) to (FN) (and (A.4) holds so that (UN) is Individ-
ually Rational) we conclude that the Union of Nations is a Pareto dominant
arrangement and, consequently, both nations should be in favor of it. If, on
the contrary, A prefers (FN) to (UN) then the two nations have di®erent
interests and the Union of Nations is less likely to be implemented than in
the previous case.
The goal is to characterize for which values of c regions would unani-
mously agree on forming a Union, while, were nations the players, only the
8see Bucovetsky (1998).
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poor nation would be in favor of the Union. From now on we explicitly write
the expected utility as a function of c and p, for example we write EUFNA (c)
and EUFRRj (c; p).
9
Let the migration cost take the value c and the probability that a rich re-
gion gets the lucky state be p. We write UR(c; p) Â UN(c) (UN(c) Â UR(c; p))
if the following two conditions hold Simultaneously:
i) EUFNA (c) > EU
U
³
EUFNA (c) · EUU
´
ii) EUFRRj (c; p) · EUU ; for all Rj
³
EUFRRj (c; p) > EU
U for some Rj
´
:
Given inequality (6), relation Â can be simpli¯ed to
EUFNA (c) > EU
U ¸ EUFRA1 (c; p):
We write UR(c; p) » UN(c) if
either
EUFRRj (c; p) · EUU for allRj andEUFNA (c) · EUU
or
EUFRRj (c; p) > EU
U for some Rj and EUFNA (c) > EU
U :
Thus UR(c; p) Â UN(c) means that at (c; p) a union is Pareto superior
to a federal system for the regions, but not for the nations. In the case in
which the union is Pareto superior to a federation for the regions and for the
nations we write UR(c; p) » UN(c). We also write UR(c; p) » UN(c) to
denote the case in which a union is not Pareto superior for either the nations
or for the regions. We write UR(c; p) º UN(c) when either Â or » holds
or, equivalently, when UN(c) Â UR(c; p) does not hold. This motivates the
following de¯nition
Definition: We say that, for a given value of p, a union is more likely to
be implemented when the regions are the players than when the nations are
the players, and write UR(p) º UN , whenever UR(c; p) º UN(c) for all c
(in the opposite case we write UN º UR(p))
Therefore, when the economy is such that UR(p) º UN we can say that
the regions are more favorable to form a union than nations. Note that
9The ¯rst expresion doesn't contain p since the expected utility for nations is indepen-
dent of such probability.
15
UR(p) º UN might hold for some, but not all, values of p.
Proposition: Let (A.1), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) hold. Let 0 · c < cm and
¯ > 2 . Then there exists a level of p¤; 1=2 · p¤ < 1; such that we have
UR(p) º UN for p < p¤ and UN º UR(p) for p ¸ p¤: Morever, if ¼
1¡¼ > ½
we know that p¤ > 1
2
. The cut-o® value p¤ is independent of c.
Sketch of the Proof: Consider the case in which (UN) is not always
a Pareto dominant regime (the general case is analyzed in the formal proof
provided in the appendix). In ¯gures 1 and 2, we show expected utilities
of the richest nation and the richest region, as function of the migration
costs, for the federation regime and the global union. In the formal proof
we show that for p close to 1=2 (case represented in ¯gure 1), expected
utility of A1 in the (FR) intersects the expected utility level EUU at a lower
value of c (we call it c) than the value ¹c at which expected utility of A in
the (FN) intersects the level EUU . Therefore, for all c in (c; ¹c) we know
that EUFNA (c) > EU
U ¸ EUFRA1 (c; p). For the rest of values for c either
EUFNA (c) > EU
U and EUFRA1 (c; p) > EU
U (for c < c) or EUFNA (c) < EU
U
and EUFRA1 (c; p) < EU
U (for c > ¹c).
We know, by lemma 4, that expected utility of the richest region in (FR)
is increasing with p. However, expected utility of the richest nation does
not depend on p. Therefore one could intuitively think that, as p increases,
EUFRA1 (c; p) shifts and that for some level of p large enough the situation in
¯gure 1 could be reversed, so that for all c in an interval we have EUFNA (c) <
EUU · EUFRA1 (c; p). We show in the formal proof that this reversal happens
for p smaller than 1.
Given that EUFRA1 (c; p) is strictly increasing in p it is also easy to show
that there is a cut-o® value p¤ such that this reversal happens. This cut-o®
value is the one in ¯gure 2 in which EUFRA1 (c; p
¤) = EUFNA (c) = EU
U holds
for one c. From our reasoning, it is easy to see that the cut-o® value p¤ lies
between 1=2 and 1.
Thus when the regions of a nation are similar enough to each other in
expected terms (small values of p) we claim that a global union is more
likely to be achieved when the players are the regions than when the players
are the nations. However, if the degree of diversity between regions in a
nation is large enough (high values of p), then the opposite result is true.
This result could be interpreted as that regions have more incentives than
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nations to form a full global union when the rich region of a nation is not
\exploited" by the poor region (p is low). In this case, regional risk-sharing
is the main reason for a ¯scal agreement and the associated cost in terms
of redistribution among regions is not that important. When, on the other
hand, the rich region is \exploited" by the poor region in a nation (high
values of p), achieving more integration is easier if nations are the decision
makers. Notice that our concept of being \exploited" just means that there
is more redistribution than risk sharing between regions in a nation.
We cannot exclude the possibility that both nations and regions con-
sider instrumenting transfers (see Bucovetsky (1998) for a good discusion
of transfers in this type of economy) that replicate an agreement closer to a
union than to a federation. Given that migration consumes resources, in case
separation is not preferred to federation and union, there will always be a
transfer scheme in which there are enough transfers to prevent any migration
and some extra resources (the cost of migration) are distributed among the
regions or nations.
Consider the case c < c < c and p < p¤ (a similar argument can be made
for p > p¤ ) ,and suppose that a union is not always a Pareto dominant
regime. Here all regions prefer a unitary agreement to a federation whereas
only the poor nation prefers the union to the federation. One can consider
the possibility of an intermediate agreement where the two nations form a
\union" but with some additional transfers. In this case some transfers have
to be made from the poor to the rich country (which prefers a federation
to a union) and so a \full union" would not be achieved. Thus our results
are robust to the introduction of additional transfers between nations in that
case.
In the case c < c both the poor regions or nations prefer a situation in
which a union is achieved even though they have to make a positive transfer to
the rich region or to the rich nation, respectively. In that case, the amount
of the transfer needed would be negatively correlated with the degree of
integration achieved. We may consider the minimum transfer that would
make a rich nation to agree in forming a union.
De¯ne C¤ as the solution to U(C) = EUFNA (i.e. the certainty equivalent
to a federation from the point of view of nation A). Then, nation B would
need to pay to nation A a \bribe" of at least C¤¡ (1+ ½)=2 to convince it to
form a union. In that case, nation A is exactly as well o® as in a federation.
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Then to compare the maximum integration achieved in the economy with
nations with the achieved in the economy with regions, we can calculate the
certainty equivalents to a federation in each case. The economy with larger
certainty equivalent to federation will result in less integration, as it requires
a higher bribe. Just looking at ¯gure 1 one can see that which bribe is higher
depends on the parameters of the model. For migration costs high enough
(though lower than c) one has EUFNA ¸ EUFRA1 (this is a general result that is
provided in the proof of the proposition),so in the economy of nations a higher
bribe is needed and consequently less integration is obtained. However, in
the example of ¯gure 1 for low enough migration costs, the opposite result
would be obtained. This means that for low enough migration costs our
results may not be robust to introduction of transfers.
6 Final Comments
We have analyzed the circumstances under which two nations would choose
a ¯scal agreement implying less integration than the ¯scal agreement that
would have been chosen by the regions forming those nations. Our analysis
yields some interesting political conclusions about the role regions versus
nations play in the formation of supranational economic areas. The claim
that regions have more incentives than nations to form a full global union
is likely to be correct when nations are economic stable arrengements, i.e.
when p is low so that the rich region of a nation is not "exploited" by the
poor region. In this case, regional risk-sharing is the main reason for a ¯scal
agreement and the associated cost in terms of redistribution among regions
is not that important. When, on the other hand, it is not on the interest
of a rich region to be part of a nation (high values of p), achieving a full
supranational union will be easier if nations are the decision makers.
An interesting situation that has not been explicitly analyzed in this paper
is the one in which A1, the richest region, prefers separation to a federation
of regions and to a union. In this case, it might also happen that region A1
would be better o® on its own than as a member of nation A It is easy to see
that this is more likely to happen when p is very high. Thus, since the union
with A2 was not in its interest, one can think of region A1 as been \forced",
by non-economic reasons, to be member of nation A. Therefore when the
original nations are sustained by non-economic reasons, were their regions
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asked, the richest regions could even choose separation to any other ¯scal
agreement. We shouldn't conclude, however, that whenever the nations are
more in favor of the union than the regions, i.e. whenever UR(p) Á UN
happens, the richest region is \exploited" by the poor region, since it is easy
to provide numerical examples for which p is high and the rich region is better
o® being part of its country than on its own and still UR(p) Á UN:
We have not considered the possibility of a partial union or federation
of one, two, or three regions. If this type of agreements were considered, a
federation or a union of the three richer regions, excluding the poorest, would
always be preferred by the three regions to a federation or union of the four
regions.
We have used a very simple model with a representative agent in each
region. It is true that with heterogeneous agents migration and tranfers have
very di®erent e®ects on welfare. It could happen that migration redistributes
risk among the population in a nation (or region) in such a way that it is
always a worse risk sharing device that the one provided by tranfers (see
Wildasin, 1995). The analysis of a model with heterogenous agents is left for
future research.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
We have to show that no net migration °ows occur in regions in states (LH)
or (HL) for c ¸ 0. There are two cases in which migration can occur in
those regions. The ¯rst happens when the migration °ow from the region
in state (LL) has been so big as to render the per capita income in such a
region equal to the per capita income in regions in states (LH) and (HL).
Then there could be, consistently with the above condition, some migration
from the regions in states (LH) and (HL) to the region in state (HH). This
limit case implies that
YLL
1=2¡ nr =
YLH
1=2
:
Solving for nr we have that the implied migration °ow is
n¤r =
YLH ¡ YLL
2YLH
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Now we want to solve for the lowest migration cost that would imply no
migration from regions in states (LH) and (HL) when the migration °ow
from region in state LL to region in state HH is n¤r. Such cost has to solve
the equation
YHH
1=2 + n¤r
¡ c = YLH
1=2
:
That is
c¤ = 2YLH(
YHH
2YLH ¡ YLL ¡ 1):
By substitution of the values for the respective regional productions implied
by Axiom 1, we obtain c¤ = 0.
The second case in which migration could happen to regions in states
(LH) and (HL) is when the level of migration to the region in state (HH),
nr, has been so big as to equalize per capita income in such a region to the
per capita income in regions in states (LH) and (HL). Then there could be
some migration from the region in state (LL) to the regions in states (LH)
and (HL). This case implies that
YHH
1=2 + n¤¤r
=
YLH
1=2
:
The implied migration °ow is
n¤¤r =
YHH ¡ YLH
2YLH
The lowest migration cost that implies no migration to regions in (LH) and
(HL) solves
YLL
1=2¡ n¤¤r
=
YLH
1=2
¡ c¤¤:
This implies
c¤¤ = 2YLH(1¡ YLL
2YLH ¡ YHH ):
By substitution of the values for the respective regional productions implied
by Axiom 1, we obtain c¤¤ = 0.
We conclude that for every c ¸ 0 no net migration °ows will occur in
regions in states (LH) and (HL). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 2:
The equilibrium migration under (FN) is given by condition (2)
½
1 + nn
¡ c = 1
1¡ nn
By Lemma 1 the equilibrium migration under (FR) is given by (5)
(½+ °)=2
1=2 + nr
¡ c = (1¡ °)=2
1=2¡ nr
Assuming our particular value of ° = (½ ¡ 1)=2, we could write this second
condition as
(3½¡ 1)=2
1 + 2nr
¡ c = (3¡ ½)=2
1¡ 2nr
By simply comparing the numerators of condition (2) and the modi¯ed con-
dition (5), we conclude that 2nr > nn. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
i) In our particular economy, the total per-capita income to be distributed
between the region in state of nature HH and the region in state of nature
LL (and also in nations H and L) is (1 + ½)=2. Thus, we have the identity
CHHNHH + CLL(1¡NHH) = (1 + ½)=2
where 1 is the total population of the two regions and NHH the percentage
of that total living in the region in state of nature HH, 0 · NHH · 1. Since
CHH ¡ c = CLL we also have
CHHNHH + (CHH ¡ c)(1¡NHH) = (1 + ½)=2
so CHH = (1 + ½)=2 + c(1 ¡ NHH). The same identity holds for CH , CL
and NH : Thus, per-capita income in the region in state HH increases as the
population of the other region increases. That is, it decreases with migra-
tion. This implies that in the federation of regions, where migration to the
region in state HH is higher than under the federation of nations, the region
in state HH ends up with a lower level of per capita income than under the
federation of nations. The statement in ii) follows easily from CHH¡c = CLL.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4:
dEUFRA1
dp
= ¼U(CHH) + (1¡ 2¼)U(CHL)¡ (1¡ ¼)U(CLL)
Simplifying the right-hand side, and recalling from Lemma 1 that CHH >
CHL > CLL, we can conclude that
dEUFRA1
dp
> ¼U(CHH)¡ ¼U(CHL) > 0
as we wanted to show. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5:
From the de¯nitions of EUFRA1 , CHH ; CHL and CLL
@EUFRA1
@c
= n0[¡¼pU 0(CHH) YHH
[1
2
+ nr]2
+ (1¡ ¼)(1¡ p)U 0(CLL) YLL
[1
2
¡ nr]2
Di®erentiating again with respect to c
@2EUFRA1
@c2
=
"
@EUFRA1
@c
#
n00
n0
+[n0]2
"
¼pU 00(CHH)
Y 2HH
(1
2
+ nr)4
+ (1¡ ¼)(1¡ p)U 00(CLL) Y
2
LL
(1
2
¡ nr)4
#
+2[n0]2
"
¼pU 0(CHH)
YHH
(1
2
+ nr)3
+ (1¡ ¼)(1¡ p)U 0(CLL) YLL
(1
2
¡ nr)3
#
from the fact that ¯ = ¡U 00(x)
U 0(x) x for all x
@2EUFRA1
@c2
=
"
@EUFRA1
@c
#
n00
n0
(2¡ ¯)[n0]2
"
¼pU 0(CHH)
CHH
(1
2
+ nr)2
+ (1¡ ¼)(1¡ p)U 0(CLL) CLL
(1
2
¡ nr)2
#
By assumption ¯ > 2 , hence
@2EUFRA1 (c)
@c2
· 0 at any c such that @EUFRA1 (c)
@c
= 0.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of the Proposition:
If the value of ½ is too large it might happen that, for all positive values of
the migration cost c, a federation is a worse insurance device for nation A
than a union so that EUU ¸ EUFNA : The following condition implies that
there exists values of c for which such inequality is not true so that (UN) is
not always a Pareto dominant regime10,
¼
1¡ ¼ ¸ ½
Thus we will divide the proof of the theorem in two cases. The ¯rst will be
the one in which this condition is satis¯ed. The second will consider the case
in which (UN) is always Pareto dominant for the nations.
1) Assume ¼
1¡¼ ¸ ½ is satis¯ed.
We will show that for small values of p; UR(p) Â UN is satis¯ed whereas
for large values of p; UN Â UR(p) is satis¯ed. Then a continuity argument
will close the proof.
1.a) Consider the extreme case with p = 1=2:
We ¯rst show that there exists a c and a ¹c so that for every c 2 (c; ¹c)
we have UR(c; 1
2
) Â UN(c): Recall that EUU = U(1+½
2
): Thus UR(c; 1
2
) Â
UN(c) i® the inequalities
EUFNA (c) > U(
1 + ½
2
) (7)
and
EUFRRj (c;
1
2
) · U(1 + ½
2
) for all Rj (8)
hold simultaneously.
By the inequalities given in (6) we know that (8) is equivalent to
EUFRA1 (c;
1
2
) · U(1 + ½
2
) (80)
Let ¹c > 0 be such that
EUFNA (c) = U(
1 + ½
2
) (9)
10See Bucovetsky for the proof of this claim.
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Existence of c follows from: a) EUFNA (0) = EU
U ; b) for cm we haveEUFNA (c
m) =
EUSA; c) by (A.4) EU
U > EUSA; d) by continuity of EU
FN
A (c) and; e)
since ¼
1¡¼ ¸ ½ there exists ec such that EUFNA (ec) > EUU(see ¯gure 1).
If such ¹c is not unique take the in¯mum of them. Also realize that con-
dition ¼
1¡¼ ¸ ½ guarantees that ¹c > 0:
We can write
EUFNA (c) = ¼U(CH) + (1¡ ¼)U(CL) (10)
where CH and CL are the equilibrium per capita income levels when the
migration cost is c: For that c and for p = 1
2
we write the expected utility for
region A1 in (FR) as
EUFRA1 (c;
1
2
) =
1
2
U(
1 + ½
2
) + ¼
1
2
U(CHH) + (1¡ ¼)1
2
U(CLL); (11)
so that inequality (8') holds, for c and p = 1
2
, if
¼
1
2
U(CHH) + (1¡ ¼)1
2
U(CLL) <
1
2
U(
1 + ½
2
) (12)
Lemma 3 states that CL > CLL and CH > CHH . It follows that
¼
1
2
U(CHH) + (1¡ ¼)1
2
U(CLL) <
1
2
[¼U(CH) + (1¡ ¼)U(CL)] (13)
and from (9) and (10) we have
1
2
[¼U(CH) + (1¡ ¼)U(CL)] = 1
2
U(
1 + ½
2
) (14)
Thus (14) and (13) imply that (12) holds and, as a consequence, (8') and (8)
also hold for ¹c and p = 1
2
.
By continuity of EUFRA1 (c;
1
2
), for a set of values of c smaller than ¹c we have
that (8) also holds. It only rests to show that for values of c close enough to
c and c < c we have that (7) is true, i.e. EUFNA (c) > U(
1+½
2
). Since EUFNA (c)
is continuous at c we only need to show that EUFNA (c) is decreasing at c. But
this follows from observations a)-e) above. Summing up: we have shown that
there exists a set (c0; ¹c) of values of c that satisfy (7) and (8) simultaneously,
i.e. for all c 2(c0; ¹c) we have UR(c; 1
2
) Â UN(c):
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Let c be de¯ned as follows
c = Inffc : EUFRA1 (c;
1
2
) = U(
1 + ½
2
)g (15)
By the argument given above we know that EUFRA1 (¹c;
1
2
) < U(1+½
2
) and we
also have that EUFRA1 (0;
1
2
) = U(1+½
2
): Then, quasi-concavity of EUFRA1 (c;
1
2
)
implies that c < ¹c: Quasi-concavity also implies that for all c 2 (c; ¹c) we have
EUFRA1 (c;
1
2
) · U(1+½
2
): Remember that we already showed that EUFNA (c) >
U(1+½
2
) for all 0 < c < c: Therefore we have UR(c; 1
2
) Â UN(c) for all
c 2 (c; ¹c)
Next, we show that UR(c; 1
2
) » UN(c) for all c =2(c; ¹c): Quasi-concavity
of the functions EUFRA1 (c;
1
2
) and EUFNA (c) and the fact that both of them are
decreasing at c imply that EUFRA1 (c;
1
2
) < U(1+½
2
) for all c > c and EUFNA (c) ·
U(1+½
2
) for all c > c: In this case a union is Pareto e±cient for both the regions
and the nations. Hence we have UR(c; 1
2
) » UN(c) for all c > c:
The de¯nition of c and the equalities EUFRA1 (0;
1
2
) = EUFNA (0) = U(
1+½
2
)
and quasi-concavity of these functions imply that EUFRA1 (c;
1
2
) > U(1+½
2
) for
all c < c and EUFNA (c) > U(
1+½
2
) for all c < c . Hence, a union is not Pareto
superior to a federation neither for the regions nor for the nations and we
have UR(c; 1
2
) » UN(c) for all c < c .
A continuity argument can be used to show that for some values of p > 1
2
we still have UR(p) Â UN .
1.b) Now consider the limit case in which p = 1. We have
EUFRA1 (c; 1) = ¼U(CHH) + (1¡ ¼)U(CHL)
By the reasoning in Lemma 1, we know that CHH > CHL =
1+½
2
. So triv-
ially EUFRA1 (c; 1) > EU
U for every c ¸ 0. Thus, when p = 1, a union is
never Pareto superior to a federation for the regions. However EUFNA (c) is
independent of p, and we know that EUFNA (c) · EUU for all c > c and
EUFNA (c) > EU
U for all c < c where the value c is the one given in part 1.a)
above.
1.c) EUFRA1 is continuous in p and, by Lemma 4, is also strictly increasing
in p. Then, existence of p¤ > 1
2
easily follows. It is also easy to check that p¤
is such that EUFRA1 (c; p
¤) = EUFNA (c) = EU
U (see Figure 2).
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2) Assume now that (UN) is always Pareto dominant for the nations.
For c = 0 a union will give the same expected utility as that of any kind
of federation. Therefore, for costless migration EUFRA1 (0; p) = EU
FN
A (0) =
EUU . Since EUFNA (c) · EUU for all c ¸ 0, quasi-concavity of EUFNA (c)
implies that EUFNA (c) is decreasing. If EU
FR
A1 (c; p) is increasing (decreasing)
in c at c = 0; by quasi-concavity, we have UN º UR(p) (UN ¹ UR(p)).
Thus, we need to show that there exists p¤ such that for all p < p¤ the function
EUFRA1 (0; p) is decreasing in c, and for p > p
¤ the function EUFRA1 (0; p) is
increasing in c:
From the de¯nitions of EUFRA1 , CHH ; CHL and CLL;
@EUFRA1 (0; p)
@c
= n0r(c)[¡¼pU 0(CHH)
YHH
[1
2
+ nr]2
+(1¡¼)(1¡p)U 0(CLL) YLL
[1
2
¡ nr]2 ]
However when c = 0 we know that free migration leads to
CHH =
YHH
1
2
+ nr
=
YLL
1
2
¡ nr = CLL
This implies that we could write
@EUFRA1 (0; p)
@c
= n0r(c)U
0(CHH)CHH [
¡¼p
1
2
+ nr
+
(1¡ ¼)(1¡ p)
1
2
¡ nr ]:
Given (A.1), the implied migration °ow is
nr =
2½¡ 2
2½+ 2
:
Consider the case where p = 1:
@EUFRA1 (0; 1)
@c
= n0r(c)U
0(CHH)CHH [
¡¼
1
2
+ nr
]:
Given that n0r(c) < 0, this derivative is always positive.
Now consider the extreme case where p = 1=2, so
@EUFRA1 (0;
1
2
)
@c
= n0r(c)U
0(CHH)CHH
1
2
[
¡¼
1
2
+ nr
+
(1¡ ¼)
1
2
¡ nr ]:
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The sign of the above derivative is not determined. However, we know
that
@EUFRA1 (0; 1)
@c
>
@EUFRA1 (0;
1
2
)
@c
:
Lemma 4, and that fact that the utility function is continuous as a func-
tion of p and c are enough to guarantee the existence of a p¤ such that: i) if
@EUFRA1 (0;
1
2
)
@c
¸ 0 we have p¤ = 1
2
and UN Â UR(p) for all p; ii) If @EUFRA1 (0; 12 )
@c
< 0
then p¤ > 1
2
and for p · p¤ we have UR(p) » UN and for all p >p¤ we have
UR(p) Â UN . Q.E.D.
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